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COERCIVE INTERVENTIONS IN 
PREGNANCY: LAW AND ETHICS+ 
DEBRA DEBRUIN, PHD* AND MARY FAITH MARSHALL, PHD HEC-C, FCCM** 
Women1 experience tremendous pressure to protect fetuses from risk 
during pregnancy.  
The dominant idea of a ‘good mother’ in North America requires that 
women abjure personal gain, comfort, leisure, time, income, and even 
fulfillment; paradoxically, during pregnancy, when the woman is not 
yet a mother, this expectation of self-sacrifice can be even more 
stringently applied. The idea of imposing any risk on the fetus, 
however small or theoretical, for the benefit of a pregnant woman’s 
interest has become anathema.2  
While this pressure to avoid fetal risk pervades women’s day-to-day choices 
during pregnancy, this discussion focuses on coercive interventions in 
pregnancy, including forced cesarean sections and penalties for exposing fetuses 
to risk.  
Based on “systematic searches of legal, medical, news, and other periodical 
databases” with review of police and court records for identified cases, Paltrow 
and Flavin document 413 cases of arrests, detentions, and forced interventions in 
pregnancy in 44 states, the District of Columbia, and federal jurisdictions from 
1973 (the year of the Roe v. Wade3 ruling) to 2005 (the latest date for which there 
were records of cases that had reached their legal conclusion at the time the 
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 1. It should be noted that persons who do not identify as women can become pregnant, such as 
transgender men or non-binary or gender nonconforming individuals. The analysis herein will be framed 
in terms of the experience of cisgender women, because to date the documented cases of coercive 
interventions have involved pregnant cisgender women. Moreover, given the significance of gender to 
societal norms and expectations regarding pregnancy, unique pressures and challenges may affect 
transgender, non-binary and gender nonconforming individuals. While those issues extend beyond the 
more limited scope of this paper, it bears noting that these gender differences should in no way be 
understood to diminish the equal moral significance of the rights and well-being of these individuals. 
 2. Anne Drapkin Lyerly et al., Risk and the Pregnant Body, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34, 40 
(2009).  
 3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  
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article was published).4 These cases include coerced medical interventions (e.g., 
cesarean sections) as well as arrests and detentions for allegations of behaviors 
posing harms to fetuses. Given barriers to identifying cases – e.g., difficulties 
with identifying such cases in searches of legal databases and lack of reporting 
on forced interventions—the actual number is likely greater.5 Amnesty 
International has found that, between 2005 and 2017, approximately 700 women 
have been charged with crimes related to fetal neglect, “chemical endangerment” 
or “fetal assault” in Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina alone.6 Beyond 
these three states, “hundreds of others across the country have also been 
charged.”7 Note that the more recent data focus on arrests and detentions, as 
opposed to coerced medical interventions, which are also ongoing.8  
We will consider legal and ethical responses to such coercion, exploring the 
ways in which ethical approaches overlap with, supplement, or diverge from 
legal ones. We will begin by focusing on coercive medical interventions because 
the moral commitment to patient autonomy and the fiduciary duties of 
practitioners are so firmly established in this context. We will then consider to 
what extent such considerations apply to arrests or detentions of women for 
exposing their fetuses to risk.9 We will argue that, contrary to common 
assumptions, assigning personhood to fetuses does not undermine the arguments 
against coercion. Finally, we will consider recommendations for bringing 
medical and legal practice in line with ethical obligations. 
I. COERCIVE MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS 
Coercive medical interventions involve overriding pregnant women’s 
autonomous choices to impose therapeutic intervention such as cesarean 
sections, intrauterine transfusions, or enforced bed rest in an effort to shield 
fetuses from risk. Consider the following two cases in which women were 
subjected to cesarean sections against their will, when they sought a trial of labor 
to attempt vaginal birth after previously having a cesarean delivery.10 In Laura 
 
 4. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in 
the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, J.  HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y  L., 299, 302-09 (2013).  
 5. See id. at 300-02. 
 6. Criminalizing Pregnancy: Policing Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs in the USA, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL 7, 8 (2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5162032017ENGLISH.pdf.  
 7. Id.  
 8. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Unwanted Cesareans and Obstetric Violence, 
28 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 163, 163-64 (2017).  
 9. Beyond these broad categories, we will not attempt to produce a taxonomy of types of coercive 
interventions used in pregnancy in this analysis. We recognize that the categories we employ here are 
themselves diverse. Fully identifying and analyzing that diversity is a task for another project.  
 10. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem. Regional Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247, 1250 (N.D. Fla. 
1999); Dray v. Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 160 A.D.3d 614, 616 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).  
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Pemberton’s case, “a sheriff went to [her] home, took her into custody, strapped 
her legs together, and forced her to go to a hospital in an ambulance,” where the 
court-ordered cesarean was performed.11 Ms. Pemberton successfully delivered 
subsequent pregnancies vaginally, raising significant questions about the risk 
assessment prompting the court order,12 which stated “vaginal birth would pose 
a substantial risk of uterine rupture and resulting death of the baby.”13 In Rinat 
Dray’s case, the clinical team overrode her express objections and performed a 
cesarean section, without first seeking a court order. Her bladder was lacerated 
during the procedure, which required follow up surgery to repair.14 As Kolder et 
al. maintain, cases such as these “force women to assume medical risks and 
forfeit their legal autonomy in a manner not required of competent men or non-
pregnant women. Thus, basic constitutional and common-law rights are at 
issue.”15  
Pope argues that “[e]very fully briefed appellate case has held that 
clinicians may not override a woman’s right to refuse [a cesarean section] . . . 
even when they have serious concerns about the fetus.”16 His review 
acknowledges the precedent set by In re A.C., which he contends has been 
followed by all appellate courts faced with cases involving coerced cesarean 
sections.17 In that case, Angela Carder was 26-1/2 weeks pregnant and near death 
from cancer.18 Clinicians advocated for a cesarean section in an effort to save the 
fetus, but Ms. Carder repeatedly stated “I don’t want it done,” and her husband 
and parents supported her refusal.19 The hospital secured an emergency court 
order and performed the operation, but both Ms. Carder and her baby died.20 The 
surgery was determined to have been a contributing cause of Ms. Carder’s 
death.21 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the court order that 
had authorized the forced cesarean section, holding that “in virtually all cases the 
question of what is to be done is to be decided by the patient - the pregnant 
 
 11. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 306-07; cf. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1250. 
 12. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 306-07. 
 13. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.  
 14. Dray, 160 A.D.3d at 616. 
 15. Veronica E. B. Kolder, Janet Gallagher & Michael T Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical 
Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1195 (1987);  
 16. Pope, supra note 8, at 164. 
 17. Pope, supra note 8, at 165. 
 18. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1240 (D.C. 1990); see, e.g. Coercive and Punitive Governmental 
Responses to Women’s Conduct During Pregnancy, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU) 
[hereinafter Coercive and Punitive Governmental Responses] https://www.aclu.org/other/coercive-and-
punitive-governmental-responses-womens-conduct-during-pregnancy (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).  
 19. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1243; see also Coercive and Punitive Governmental Responses.  
 20. Id. at 1238; see Pope, supra note 8, at 165; see also Coercive and Punitive Governmental 
Responses, supra note 18. 
 21. Id.; see Coercive and Punitive Governmental Responses, supra note 18.   
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woman - on behalf of herself and the fetus.”22 In support of this decision, the 
appellate court offered three arguments focusing on rights of self-determination 
and bodily integrity, due process rights, and the consequences of permitting 
coercive interventions.23 We have previously summarized these arguments, with 
the aim of arguing that they must be supplemented with considerations of social 
justice that tend not to be recognized in analyses of coercion in pregnancy.24 
Here, we delve more deeply into the arguments offered by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, to investigate the ways in which ethical 
considerations relate to legal ones and to consider recommendations for bringing 
medical and legal practice in line with ethical obligations. 
The first argument is based on the court’s review of case law which affirms 
that “every person has the right, under the common law and the Constitution, to 
accept or refuse medical treatment.”25 The court highlights the precedent set by 
McFall v. Shimp to establish that concerns about fetal protection do not justify 
overriding the pregnant woman’s decision.26 In that case, the court ruled against 
forcing Shimp to donate bone marrow for a transplant that could save the life of 
his cousin, McFall.27 The court explained:  
The common law has consistently held to a rule which provides that 
one human being is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take 
action to save another human being or to rescue. . . For our law to 
compel defendant to submit to an intrusion of his body would change 
every concept and principle upon which our society is founded. To do 
so would defeat the sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule 
which would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the 
line would be drawn.28 
In re A.C. denies that a fetus may have special claims on the pregnant woman: 
“a fetus cannot have rights in this respect superior to those of a person who has 
already been born.”29 
The appellate court’s decision also acknowledges the pregnant woman’s 
due process rights, expressing concern that any case considering an emergency 
order to mandate intervention for fetal protection will involve such intense time 
pressures that the woman will simply be unable to “prepare meaningfully for 
 
 22. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1237; see Pope, supra note 8, at 165; see also Coercive and Punitive 
Governmental Responses, supra note 18. 
 23. Id. at 1238-48; see Pope, supra note 8, at 165; see also Coercive and Punitive Governmental 
Responses, supra note 18. 
 24. Debra A. DeBruin & Mary Faith Marshall, Policing Women to Protect Fetuses: Coercive 
Interventions During Pregnancy, 12 ANALYZING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 95-111 (2019).  
 25. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1247. 
 26. See id. at 1244. 
 27. McFall v Shimp, 10 Pa.D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978). 
 28. Id. 
 29. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244. 
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trial.”30  The court further stated “[t]he procedural shortcomings rampant in these 
cases are not mere technical deficiencies. They undermine the authority of the 
decisions themselves…”31 In cases where clinicians impose coercive 
interventions without a court order,32 there is not even any pretense of due 
process.  
Finally, the appellate court’s decision reflects a concern with the 
consequences of coerced intervention:  
Rather than protecting the health of women and children, court-
ordered caesareans erode the element of trust that permits a pregnant 
woman to communicate to her physician without fear of reprisal all 
information relevant to her proper diagnosis and treatment. An even 
more serious consequence of court-ordered intervention is that it 
drives women at high risk of complications during pregnancy and 
childbirth out of the healthcare system to avoid coerced treatment.33  
The legal reasoning set forth in In re A.C. mirrors the commitment in bioethics 
to the principles of respect for persons and beneficence, as well as the fiduciary 
nature of the clinician-patient relationship. Indeed, Allen noted that “[t]he 
decision in In Re A.C. reaches virtually the identical conclusion [as the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (hereinafter “ACOG”) Ethics 
Committee’s 1987 Opinion on Maternal-Fetal Conflict] but does so through 
primarily legal analysis as opposed to the medical-ethical reasoning used in the 
Committee Opinion.”34 In addition, Pope notes that the position taken by 
appellate courts in cases involving coercive cesarean sections is supported by 
“leading relevant medical societies and human rights organizations.”35 He 
concludes: “[a] woman’s right to refuse a cesarean is clearly established in both 
appellate court opinions and codes of medical ethics.”36  
While In re A.C. focuses on coercive cesarean sections, the bioethical 
considerations grounding ethics guidance on coercive cesareans applies to other 
unwanted medical interventions as well. Concerns about self-determination and 
bodily integrity, the well-being of women and their babies, and the moral 
importance of the fiduciary nature of the clinician-patient relationship are 
 
 30. Id. at 1248.  
 31. Id. (quoting Janet Gallagher Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal 
Rights,10 HARV. WOMEN L.J. 9, 49 (1989)).  
 32. Pope, supra note 8, at 166; Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 Geo L.J. 721,731 (2018). 
 33. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1248 (internal citation omitted).  
 34. Id. at 38. 
 35. Pope, supra note 8, at 164; cf  Norman C. Frost et al., Fetal Therapy: Ethical Considerations, 
81 AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS: COMM. OF BIOETHICS 898, 899 (1988); Refusal of Medically 
Recommended Treatment During Pregnancy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 1, 1 (2016); 
Helene Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal 
Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2664 
(1990).  
 36. Pope, supra note 8, at 170.  
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foundational in bioethics, not limited to the context of cesarean sections. The 
principle of respect for persons grounds fundamental concern for rights of self-
determination and bodily integrity – moral and legal rights that women do not 
lose due to pregnancy. The violation of trust inherent in the imposition of 
coercive interventions undermines the clinician-patient relationship – a problem 
in itself given that it “transforms the woman’s physician into her adversary, 
disrupting the treatment relationship,”37 and for its potential to drive women 
away from needed care during pregnancy. The principle of beneficence requires 
a concern with the well-being of pregnant women and the babies they will birth, 
and so provides ethical foundation for the concern about influences that might 
undermine access to supportive care. Thus, the ethical and legal consensus 
prohibiting coercion should be understood to apply generally to any unwanted 
medical interventions in pregnancy. 
Nevertheless, coercive medical interventions continue to be imposed upon 
pregnant women.38 If trial courts are continuing to provide emergency orders to 
permit coercion, then they ignore or flout established precedent in doing so. 
Sometimes, clinicians forgo court orders and simply coerce women to sign 
“consent” forms for the procedures in question, for example, by threatening them 
with removal of child custody or abandonment by the clinician if she refuses.39 
Additionally, sometimes clinicians override the woman’s refusal of consent and 
impose the intervention on their own or with the support of institutional policy, 
though without a court order.40 In such cases, women have had mixed results in 
securing legal redress. For instance, it may be difficult to prove that the woman 
was coerced into “consenting” if there is a signature on a consent form, and 
likewise, juries may be unlikely to award damages for dignitary harms in the 
absence of severe physical harm.41 The overwhelming cultural view concerning 
birth – one that affects the judgment of judges and juries alike – places “the 
existence of a healthy baby” as a higher priority than the rights and welfare of 
the mother.42  
Kolder et al.’s survey of fellowship directors in maternal-fetal medicine 
found that 46% believed that pregnant women who refused medical 
recommendations should be detained to ensure compliance, and 47% endorsed 
the use of court-ordered medical interventions.43 This study preceded the 
establishment of legal precedent discussed above.44 Nevertheless, these attitudes 
 
 37. Kukura, supra note 32, at 743. 
 38. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 306-08; Pope, supra note 8, at 164-66.  
 39. Pope, supra note 8, at 167; Kukura, supra note 32, at 747-48.  
 40. Pope, supra note 8, at 167; Kukura, supra note 32, at 751. 
 41. Pope, supra note 8, at 166-68; Cf. Kukura, supra note 32, at 780-81.  
 42. Kukura, supra note 32, at 788. 
 43. Kolder et al., supra note 15, at 1193. 
 44. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
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persist. More recently, Samuels et al. surveyed obstetricians and health lawyers 
and found that 51% of respondents would be highly likely to use a court order if 
both the woman and the fetus were healthy.45 Members of the two professions 
did not differ significantly in their responses.46 These studies do not address the 
willingness of health professionals to impose coercive interventions without a 
court order, but they do establish willingness over time to override women’s 
autonomy and bodily integrity in pursuit of fetal benefit. 
Samuels et al. thus recommend that women “should seek out providers who 
share their philosophy regarding the rights of pregnant women.”47 However, this 
is an unrealistic solution for many women due to geographic and insurance/cost 
barriers to accessing maternity care.48 They also rightly recommend that: (1) 
providers never go to court before calling an ethics consult, (2) ACOG and 
obstetric training programs develop educational modules about coercion, and (3) 
there be a “national dialogue about the role of court orders so that women can be 
assured that the care they receive will be equitable and predictable.”49 These 
recommendations highlight an important role for bioethics in countering use of 
coercion. Perhaps even more can be done. For example, some have suggested 
conceiving of birth plans as advance directives to promote pregnant women’s 
autonomy.50 However valuable written preferences may be to communication, 
the barrier to promoting women’s autonomy during pregnancy is not typically a 
lack of communication but rather the willingness of health providers and legal 
professionals to override women’s autonomous decisions. Thus, while we 
endorse the value of birth plans, we fear that they are unlikely to prompt change 
concerning coercive interventions in the current cultural climate. Another, 
perhaps more powerful option, is this: ACOG’s Code of Professional Ethics 
warns that “noncompliance with the Code … may affect an individual’s initial 
or continuing Fellowship in the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists.”51 To date, ACOG has refrained from withholding or removing 
 
 45. Terri-Ann Samuels et al., Obstetricians, Health Attorneys, and Court-Ordered Cesarean 
Sections, 17 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 107, 108 (2007).  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 112. 
 48. Nowhere to Go: Maternity Care Deserts Across the U.S., MARCH OF DIMES, 
https://www.marchofdimes.org/materials/Nowhere_to_Go_Final.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2019).  
 49. Samuels et al., supra note 45, at 113. While Samuels et al., do not note this, the use of ethics 
consultation to resolve cases of conflict over treatment refusals is specifically advocated by the 
American College of Obstetrician and Gynecologists. Refusal of Medically Recommended Treatment 
During Pregnancy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS 1, 5 (2016). 
 50. See Nayna C. Philipsen and Dorothy R. Haynes, The Similarities Between Birth Plans and 
Living Wills, 14 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 46, 47-48 (2005); see also Nadia N. Sawicki, Birth Plans as 
Advance Directives, BILL HEALTH BLOG (May 1, 2017), 
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/01/birth-plans-as-advance-directives/.  
 51. Code of Professional Ethics, AM. C. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG) (Dec. 
2018), https://www.acog.org/About-ACOG/ACOG-Departments/Committees-and-Councils/Volunteer-
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Fellowship from those who have imposed coercive interventions on their 
patients, thus violating the Code of Ethics. Were ACOG to begin using this 
authority, it might powerfully counteract provider willingness to override 
women’s autonomy.  
At a more systemic level, beyond the attitudes and actions of individual 
providers, Kukura argues that economic incentives built into our health care 
system reward intervention, promoting conflicts of interest and pressure to 
perform lucrative procedures.52 While abundant reason exists to question the 
current economic incentives in clinical care, these same incentives operate in 
clinical contexts other than obstetric care without the same embrace of coercive 
intervention. Oppressive norms regarding gender primarily ground coercive 
practices: women’s rights and interests are subordinated to those of fetuses, and 
women are denied the moral or epistemic authority to determine what is best for 
themselves and their fetuses. Kukura acknowledges that these norms influence 
legal practices around coercion when she states, “[s]ociety’s widespread 
expectation of maternal self-sacrifice makes it difficult for courts to recognize 
the injury associated with forcing medical treatment on an unwilling woman in 
labor.”53 
II. OTHER FORMS OF COERCION 
Pregnant women are subjected to a wide array of coercive interventions 
beyond forced medical interventions. For example, they have been arrested and 
detained not only for fetal harms related to illegal substance use, but also for 
doctor prescribed methadone therapy, falling down the stairs, attempting suicide, 
failing to wear a seatbelt, and other behaviors that would not have resulted in 
arrest or detention had the women not been pregnant.54 Consider the following 
cases. For example, Casey Shehi took half a Valium two times late in her 
pregnancy to manage extreme distress, believing that doing so would not harm 
her fetus, because her doctor had prescribed painkillers during her pregnancy.55 
Given a routine drug screen during labor, she tested positive for benzodiazepines. 
 
Agreement/Code-of-Professional-Ethics-of-the-American-College-of-Obstetricians-and-
Gynecologists?IsMobileSet=false.   
 52. Kukura, supra note 32, at 766-769.  
 53. Kukura, supra note 32, at 776.  
 54. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 300, 332; Criminalizing Pregnancy: Policing Pregnant 
Women Who Use Drugs in the USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 7, 61 (2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5162032017ENGLISH.pdf.; Nina Martin, Take a 
Valium, Lose Your Kid, Go to Jail, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-the-womb-is-a-crime-scene; Lynn M. Paltrow & Lisa K. 
Sangoi, The Dangerous State Laws that are Punishing Pregnant People, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 28, 
2016, 5:36 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/criminalization-pregnancy-us-43e4741bb514/. 
 55. Nina Martin, Take a Valium, Lose Your Kid, Go to Jail, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-the-womb-is-a-crime-scene. 
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However, her baby was healthy, and his drug test came back negative.56 
Nevertheless, she was arrested and “charged with ‘knowingly, recklessly, or 
intentionally’ causing her baby to be exposed to controlled substances in the 
womb — a felony punishable in her case by up to 10 years in prison.”57 
Additionally, Bei Bei Shuai attempted suicide while pregnant.58 She survived, 
but her baby – who was delivered by cesarean section when she was taken to the 
hospital – did not.59 Prosecutors charged her with feticide and murder.60 Shuai 
spent over a year in jail,61 then was released on bail and subjected to electronic 
monitoring for more than a year. In the face of strong public outcry against her 
prosecution, she was offered a plea deal which she accepted very shortly before 
her trial was to begin. The result was that she pled guilty to “criminal 
recklessness,” which is a misdemeanor.62 It is important to keep in mind that 
attempted suicide is not a crime.  
While In re A.C.’s legal precedent may not extend to these types of cases, 
the ethical arguments do apply here. Consider Nelson et al.’s commentary on 
self-determination in this context:  
The prospect of courts literally managing the lives of pregnant women 
and extensively intruding into their daily activities is frightening and 
antithetical to the fundamental role that freedom of action plays in our 
society. … It is far better simply to avoid compelling pregnant women 
to live as seems good to a particular physician, judge, or even to the 
rest of us than to force them to sacrifice their wills and their bodies on 
the altar of someone else’s notion of the good.63  
Liberty and self-determination are fundamental values in our culture and not 
remotely limited to the context of medical intervention.64 In the broader context, 
limits on freedom are often justified if one’s exercise of liberty harms others. 
Because coercion in pregnancy is rationalized by avoidance of fetal risk – or 
punishment for actions that allegedly cause fetal risk – we shall consider the 
application of the harm principle in the section on fetal personhood below. 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622-23 (Ind. App. Ct. 2012). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ed Pilkington, Indiana Prosecuting Chinese Woman for Suicide Attempt that Killed her Foetus, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2012 1:36 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/30/indiana-
prosecuting-chinese-woman-suicide-foetus.  
 62. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 622-23; see also NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, Thank You! 
Bei Bei Shuai is Free and More!, (Aug. 6, 2013) 
https://www.nationaladvocatesforpregnantwomen.org/thank-you-bei-bei-shuai-is-free-and-more/.  
 63. Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to 
Live as Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 756-57, 763 (1986). 
 64. Id. at 714, 755. 
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Due process rights are an additional concern in this broader context. 
Paltrow and Flavin’s review demonstrates that, in a majority of cases, coercion 
is imposed without prospective evidence of harm to the fetus or baby, or of a 
causal link between the actions of the woman and adverse outcomes, such as 
stillbirth.65 In these broader cases of coercion, compromises of due process are 
not as inherent as they are in the emergent context of coercive medical 
interventions. However, these flagrant violations of due process rights are even 
more morally problematic because they are more readily avoidable.  
Finally, concerns about the negative consequences of coercion extend to 
this broader context as well. In re A.C. decried the corrosive effect of coercive 
medical interventions on trust in the clinician-patient relationship and the 
resulting tendency of patients to avoid seeking care.66 While the imposition of 
coercion outside of the health care context may not involve the violation of 
fiduciary duties, evidence suggests that fears of prosecution, or removal of child 
custody (not only of the newborn, but of the woman’s other children as well) for 
drug or alcohol use drive pregnant women to avoid prenatal care or hospital 
delivery.67 According to Paltrow and Flavin:  
Our findings challenge the notion that arrests and detentions promote 
maternal, fetal, and child health or provide a path to appropriate 
treatment. Significantly, detention in health and correctional facilities 
has not meant that the pregnant women (and their fetuses) received 
prompt or appropriate prenatal care. Our research into cases claiming 
that arrests and detentions would ensure that pregnant women were 
provided with appropriate drug treatment or that only women who had 
refused treatment would be arrested or prosecuted overwhelmingly 
found that such claims were untrue. In some cases, women were 
arrested despite the fact that they were voluntarily participating in 
drug treatment. Our findings also lend support to the medical and 
public health consensus that punitive approaches undermine maternal, 
fetal, and child health by deterring women from care and from 
communicating openly with people who might be able to help them.68 
Therefore, coercive interventions are antithetical to duties of beneficence. 
 
 65. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 317-18.  
 66. See generally In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990). 
 67. See Rebecca Stone, Pregnant Women and Substance Use: Fear, Stigma, and Barriers to Care, 
3 HEALTH & JUST. 1, 3 (2015); Coercive and Punitive Governmental Responses to Women’s Conduct 
During Pregnancy, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (ACLU), https://www.aclu.org/other/coercive-
and-punitive-governmental-responses-womens-conduct-during-pregnancy (last visited, Feb. 3, 2020); 
Phillip H. Jos, Mary Faith Marshall and Martin Perlmutter, The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use 
During Pregnancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 120, 125 (1995). 
 68. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 332. 
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III. FETAL PERSONHOOD 
Some types of laws—including fetal homicide laws, laws regarding 
chemical endangerment of the fetus, and recent state abortion bans—have been 
interpreted as recognizing the legal personhood of the fetus, and hence have been 
(or, if they withstand legal challenge, will be) used to rationalize coercion in 
pregnancy.69 How would legal recognition of fetal personhood affect the legal 
and moral analyses outlined above regarding coercive interventions in 
pregnancy?  
None of the overlapping legal and ethical arguments against coercive 
medical interventions would be undermined by a legal recognition of fetal 
personhood. The arguments concerning the woman’s self-determination and 
bodily integrity rely centrally on the rejection, as expressed in McFall v. Shimp, 
of the permissibility of forcing one person to submit to unwanted procedures for 
the benefit of another.70 Since both McFall and Shimp were adults, neither 
party’s personhood was open to question in that case. Extending personhood to 
the fetus does nothing to affect the applicability of this reasoning to pregnancy. 
Similarly, women’s due process rights must be respected regardless of the moral 
status of the fetus. The argument regarding the consequences of imposing 
coercive medical interventions becomes even more pressing if the fetus is 
recognized as a person because persons have stronger moral claims on others 
than nonpersons do. Concerns that the prospect of being subjected to coercive 
interventions may undermine obstetric care indicate that the best way to 
safeguard fetuses is to forgo the use of coercion. Moreover, the use of coercion 
is premised on the misguided (and unethical) assumption of a maternal-fetal 
conflict. As Oberman notes, “these are not maternal-fetal conflicts at all, but 
rather maternal-doctor conflicts.”71 In reality, fetal well-being is almost always 
consonant with the interests of the pregnant woman.72 ACOG addresses 
disagreements between the pregnant patient and her clinician: 
However, a pregnant woman and her obstetrician–gynecologist may 
disagree about which clinical decisions and treatments are in her best 
interest and that of her fetus. As with a nonpregnant patient, a pregnant 
woman may evaluate the risks and benefits of recommended medical 
 
 69. See Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 335-36; see also Lynn M. Paltrow and Lisa K. Sangoi, 
The Dangerous State Laws That Are Punishing Pregnant People, THINKPROGRESS (September 28, 
2016) (last visited September 16, 2019) https://thinkprogress.org/criminalization-pregnancy-us-
43e4741bb514/; see generally Glen A. Halva-Neubauer and Sara L. Zeigler, Promoting Fetal 
Personhood: The Rhetorical and Legislative Strategies of the Pro-Life Movement after Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 22 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 101 (2010). 
 70. See McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.3d 90, 91 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978). 
 71. Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in 
Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 454 (2000). 
 72. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (ACOG), COMM. OP. NO. 664, REFUSAL 
OF RECOMMENDED TREATMENT DURING PREGNANCY, 1, 1, 3 (2016). 
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treatment differently than her obstetrician–gynecologist and, 
therefore, may refuse recommended therapies or treatments. Such 
refusals are based not only on clinical considerations but also on the 
patient’s roles and relationships; they reflect her assessment of 
multiple converging interests: her own, those of her developing fetus, 
and those of her family or community.73  
The notion that clinicians or judges are better positioned to make such 
assessments is shamefully arrogant. Yet, in our culture, women’s interests are 
subordinated to concerns about fetal well-being and women’s judgments about 
fetal well-being are subordinated to those of clinicians, judges, and legislators.   
What about other forms of coercion? Consider, for example arrests and 
detentions of women who use illicit drugs during pregnancy. How would 
women’s rights to self-determination balance against fetuses’ purported 
personhood rights in such cases? Arrests and detentions involve dramatic 
limitations of a person’s rights and liberties. The harm principle dictates that 
limitations on liberty may be justifiable if the exercise of liberty causes harm to 
others. So, there may be a place for balancing rights and interests if we were to 
recognize fetal personhood. However, Paltrow and Flavin found, in many cases, 
allegations against women lacked evidence of risk of harm, or evidence of causal 
connection between the woman’s actions and risk of fetal harm.74 The harm 
principle simply does not justify coercive intervention in such cases. Moreover, 
the reliability and validity of the evidence base regarding perinatal exposure to 
drugs is evolving, arguably hampered in the past at least in part by the exclusion 
of pregnant women from federally funded human subjects research. The 
overriding problem - which speaks directly to the hypocrisy of punitive and 
coercive interventions based largely on clinical and judicial assumptions - is 
clearly acknowledged in the recent National Institutes of Health multi-institute 
funded Healthy Brain and Child Development Study, which acknowledges that 
“[t]he effects of early exposure to opioids on infant and child development are 
unknown.”75 The study cohort includes pregnant women, and over a ten year 
period will gather “data on pregnancy and fetal development; infant and early 
childhood structural and functional brain imaging; anthropometrics; medical 
history; family history; biospecimens; and social, emotional and cognitive 
development.”76  
Moreover, incursions against women’s due process rights, such as 
warrantless drug testing of pregnant women77 and prosecuting them without 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 318. 
 75. HEALthy Brain and Child Development Study, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
https://heal.nih.gov/research/infants-and-children/healthy-brain (last updated Nov. 26, 2019). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 69-70 (2001). 
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appropriate proof of harm resulting from their actions,78 cannot be tolerated. 
Considerations of the fetus’ moral status do nothing to undermine the woman’s 
due process rights. And given the evidence that such arrests and detentions deter 
women from seeking prenatal care and treatment for substance use disorder, it 
should again be recognized that zealous pursuit of punishment of women may be 
counterproductive in terms of fetal protection. 
Rather than punishment per se, authorities sometimes impose forced 
treatment for substance use disorder.79 However, there is research that challenges 
the justification of such forced treatment:  
Experts have noted that little evidence exists to support compulsory 
treatment modalities, and that the onus is therefore on advocates of 
such approaches to provide scientific evidence that compulsory 
treatment is effective, safe, and ethical. The results of the present 
systematic review, which fails to find sufficient evidence that 
compulsory drug treatment approaches are effective, appears to 
further confirm these statements … Governments should therefore 
seek alternative, evidence-based policies to address drug 
dependence.80  
In addition to concerns about effectiveness, the case of Alicia Beltran illustrates 
the harms that can accompany forced treatment for pregnant women.81  Ms. 
Beltran volunteered information about her past struggle with addiction to 
Percocet during her first prenatal visit and told her clinician that she had already 
stopped using the drug.82 When she was advised to take Suboxone to treat her 
addiction, she declined. She was arrested and taken to a hospital for a clinical 
exam, which showed her fetus to be healthy and her pregnancy progressing 
normally. Despite that determination, she was then led in shackles to a hearing 
in family court. Her fetus had legal representation at the hearing, but Ms. Beltran 
did not, despite her request for an attorney.83 She was sent to mandated treatment, 
 
 78. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 4, at 218.  
 79. Substance Use During Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 1, 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/substance-use-during-pregnancy. 
 80. Dan Werb et al., The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review, 28 
INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 1, 1 (2016). 
 81. See Daniella Silva, Shackled and Pregnant: Wis. Case Challenges ‘Fetal Protection’ Law, 
NBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013, 12:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/shackled-pregnant-
wis-case-challenges-fetal-protection-law-flna8C11457748; see also Erik Eckholm, Case Explores Rights 
of Fetus Verses Mother, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 23, 2020) 
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ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, The Case of Alicia Beltran, (Oct. 4, 2019) 
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 82. Silva, supra note 81; Eckholm, supra note 81; NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, supra 
note 81.   
 83. Silva, supra note 81; Eckholm, supra note 81; NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, supra 
note 81.   
02 DEBRUIN2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/17/2021  3:45 PM 
200 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 23:2 
where she was detained for more than 70 days before finally being released.84 
She lost her job as a result of her long absence from it.85 The case provides a 
clear example of violation of due process rights. In addition, Ms. Beltran was 
deprived of her liberty without clear and compelling justification of harm to her 
fetus, or benefit to her fetus from the forced treatment. On the contrary, Ms. 
Beltran’s resulting unemployment created greater vulnerability for herself and 
her fetus.  
Referrals to voluntary treatment are more appropriate. However, here 
unjust patterns of racial disparities pervade practice. Even in programs of 
universal drug screening in pregnancy, white women are more likely to receive 
referral to treatment, while black women are more likely to be reported to Child 
Protective Services.86  
Of course, these ethical considerations against the use of coercive 
interventions do not necessarily prevent such interventions, as data show that 
providers and legal authorities are willing to pursue them even when legal 
precedent, a paucity of evidence, and ethical guidance makes it clear they should 
not. Fetal personhood laws could further embolden providers to take matters into 
their own hands. But the legal status of the fetus would not undermine the moral 
and legal status of the woman: she maintains her personhood even when 
pregnant. Moreover, coercion tends to be counterproductive with respect to fetal 
outcomes. Thus, the widespread assumption that legal designation of the fetus as 
a person would justify broad imposition of coercive interventions against 
pregnant women is simply unfounded.  
IV. BRINGING JUSTICE TO BEAR 
While it is rarely noted in legal and ethical analyses of coercion in 
pregnancy, we must also consider concerns of social justice.87 Substantial 
socioeconomic and racial disparities exist in pregnancy outcomes even after 
controlling for variables such as access to prenatal care and other health 
behaviors. Research indicates that these disparities are linked to social 
 
 84. See Eckholm, supra note 81; see also NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, The Case of 
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 85. Silva, supra note 81; Eckholm, supra note 81; NAT’L ADVOCS. FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, supra 
note 81.   
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determinants of health.88 In addition to the social injustice inherent in such health 
disparities, they pose two additional justice concerns in the context of coercive 
interventions, which are disproportionately imposed against poor women and 
women of color.89 First, as noted above, women are often held accountable for 
poor pregnancy outcomes even when no evidence ties those outcomes to abusive 
or neglectful behavior on the part of the woman.90 Thus, disparities in pregnancy 
outcomes pose a double whammy for disadvantaged women. Not only are 
outcomes likely to be poorer for these women than for more privileged women, 
but those outcomes may expose the women to coercive interventions. Second, 
there is a hypocrisy inherent in using coercion to enforce norms regarding 
individual behaviors while turning a blind eye to the social determinants of 
health. Our society does little to address health concerns such as environmental 
exposures, but we prosecute women for substance use91 and suicide attempts92 
during pregnancy while failing to address systemic barriers to access for mental 
health and substance use disorder treatment.93 It is troubling that social action to 
protect fetuses has not “had much ‘application outside of the context where 
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women are punished.’ … ‘We don’t see any mass class action coming out of 
Flint.’”94  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have shown that ethical considerations mirror - indeed inform - legal 
analyses of coercive interventions, and that these ethical considerations offer 
clarity in the absence of legal precedent with other uses of coercion in pregnancy. 
We have explored the potential legal and ethical significance of fetal personhood 
laws in this context and argued that ethical considerations of social justice must 
supplement legal and ethical approaches to coercion during pregnancy that focus 
on individual rights and duties of beneficence. We believe that bioethics has a 
fundamental and ongoing role to play at the bedside, within professional 
associations, in the education of clinicians and jurists, in joining and authoring 
amicus briefs in legal cases, and in fostering a national conversation about the 
harms to women, to their children, to public health, and to the integrity of 
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